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This paper contributes to global perspectives on gentrification by interrogating the experiences of urban 
redevelopment and transformation in the global South. Through unpacking the contradictions of public 
space revitalization and upgrading in two favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, we critically examine 
changes to the socio-spatial fabric of informal settlements over time. Our analysis reveals that upgrading 
projects, when combined with state-led favela pacification, create socio-spatial legibility through three 
inter-related pathways of physical, symbolic, and economic discipline. In the outset, favela upgrading 
increases property prices and produces an urban scenario molded for outsiders while simultaneously 
invisibilizing traditional cultural and social uses. For favela residents, however, upgrading is 
experienced as iterative processes of securitization and restriction, which involve strategies such as 
environmental clean-up, property enclosure, police violence, and new exclusionary forms of 
investments. As a result, the most socially vulnerable residents are controlled, coercively driven away, 
and slowly erased. Over time, the apparent integration of the formal and informal city, of the rich and 











Urbanization in the global South is often characterized by spatial fragmentation and the unequal 
distribution and allocation of urban infrastructure, public spaces, and environmental amenities 
(McConnachie and Shackleton 2010; WHO 2010). Among megacities, the so-called slumsi are often 
the emblematic symbols of this “overurbanization” (Davis 2006), where social inequalities are reflected 
in the physical organization of space. While slums traditionally convey images of overcrowding, poor 
facilities, lack of basic services, and informality (UN-Habitat 2013, 85; Kuffer and Barros 2011), they 
are also increasingly relevant examples of how capital attraction policies and mega-events are shaping 
urban redevelopment and growth, employing discourses of development and “progress,” welfare, and 
security whilst silently excluding the voices and practices of historically marginalized communities 
(Leitner et al. 2007; Mascarenhas 2014; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013; Maharaj 2015). 
In slums all over the world, traditional explicit removal and demolition policies have shifted 
towards more recent in situ upgrading through private and public investments. While slums continue to 
experience prejudice, marginality, and forced removals, the current intervention paradigm is couched 
within a lexicon of state-led urban integration, development, and modernization (Conde and Magalhães 
2004; Blanco and Kobayachi 2009). Such trends – along with growing “poverty fetishism”, where 
wealthier classes associate poverty with a nostalgic notion of authenticity (Benz 2016) – reveal the 
extent to which slums are becoming politically, socially, and economically attractive, a dynamic which 
opens up new opportunities for market revaluation and re-branding (Cummings 2015; Lees, Shin and 
López- Morales 2015). 
This article contributes to the epistemology of urban (in)formality and processes of legibility 
through analyzing the transformation of favelas in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, before, 
during, and after the World Cup and Olympic Games that took place in 2014 and 2016. We respond to 
calls for revisiting research on urban redevelopment and socio-spatial change in the global South using 
the lens of gentrification and urban upgrading (see Janoschka, Sequera, and Salinas 2014). We shift 
away from the traditional scholarly attention on conflicts surrounding housing evictions and 
displacement (see Silvestre 2012; Freeman and Burgos 2017) to focus on much needed research on 
conflicts within (or created by) public spaces.ii We examine the discourses, practices, and contradictions 
of upgrading and regeneration in slums (or favelas) in Rio de Janeiro by asking: To what extent do 
concurrent processes of favela securitization and public space upgrading catalyze new forms of 





Our research finds that favela upgrading in Rio not only involves physical constructions of new 
public spaces and urban infrastructure, it is also attached to concurrent state and private interventions 
such as securitization and police control, environmental clean-up, and economic investments in tourism 
and real estate. We argue that, when combined with favela pacification, upgrading projects not only 
contribute to the socio-spatial legibility of these settlements, they also stimulate patterns of 
gentrification that can be understood as physical, symbolic, and economic forms of discipline. Through 
these intersecting processes, we observe class- and race-based social change that lead to the erasure of 
long-term socially vulnerable residents through ambivalent experiences of upgrading that affect their 
livelihoods, behavior, and sense of belonging in public spaces. More broadly, our study contributes new 
insights on how capital-oriented urban planning strategies in the global South renew the role of the state 
inside self-built settlements, create new market visibility, and eventually produce socio-cultural and 
racial invisibilization and displacement. 
 
Urban governance restructuring, legibility, and gentrification in the global South 
Our conceptual approach is premised on the idea that urban governance restructuring in the global 
South is a double-edged sword. While promulgating democracy, participatory governance, and security 
(as in the case of Brazil), gentrification also leads to increased state presence in historically marginalized 
neighborhoods, especially by creating “legible” spaces for capital through coercion and socio-spatial 
control of low income residents. In Rio, favela residents tend to be the targets of such strategies and 
often experience them within the context of urban regeneration, thus resulting in heightened 
contradictions in their experiences of socio-spatial change. 
Theories of governance decentralization received attention in the 1990s due to a renewed optimism 
over the opportunities brought on by re-democratization (Gwynne and Kay 2004; Grindle 2009). 
Through municipal schemes such as participatory budgeting, citizens gained increased control over 
public finance, service provision, environmental quality, and other development priorities (Heller 2001; 
Baiocchi 2003). Brazil is often referred to as having some of the most successful examples of 
participation in local governance (see Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Wampler 2010; Baiocchi et al. 
2011). However, re-democratization did not yield benefits for all social and economic sectors, as the 
poorest, especially residents of slums, continued to experience lack of property rights, access to public 
services, as well as increasing violent conflicts, especially so in public spaces (Moncada 2013; Davis 
2009; Walton 1998; Rodgers 2012). 
Urban public space provision is one arena upon which the intersecting dynamics between 
governance decentralization, privatization of public services and/or infrastructure, and urban violence 
are represented and practiced by public, private, and civil society actors. As these actors come together 
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within one urban space – for instance in neighborhoods of self-built settlements – they competitively 
claim ownership of it, thereby reconfiguring the uses of streets, plazas, and other open areas (Bodnar 
2015; Alves and Evenson 2011). In the case of Brazil’s favelas, the state and its affiliated organs have 
increasingly deployed securitization tactics to maintain the rule-of-law in light of violent conflicts 
within public spaces. This point draws on theories of urban security and pacification (Samara 2010; 
Graham 2012; Willis, 2015), which note that cities are increasingly relying on policing and other 
military tactics in public spaces and streets that disproportionately target low-income and minority 
neighborhoods. At the same time, public spaces are also appropriated and reconfigured by “parallel 
governments”, “multiple sovereignties” or “hybrid” institutions – such as local private militia, gangs, 
or drug traffic factions – whose practices increase the complexity of competition and disputes within 
these settlements (Alsayyad and Roy 2009; Colona and Jaffe 2016). 
In parallel to securitization policies, there is a desire on the parts of the state and market to render 
informal neighborhoods more “legible” to legitimize and exert control over people, artifacts, and 
symbols (Taylor and Broeders 2015; Scott 1999). The concept of legibility here is fundamental since it 
provides symbolic and spatial interpretations of public spaces. For example, in environmental 
psychology, legibility is considered to be a “physical and spatial quality of the surroundings” (Ramadier 
and Moser 1998). In Lynch’s The Image of the City (1960), legibility is also related to urban morphology 
and the ability of individuals to orient themselves in a city or a specific urban environment. This concept 
also relates to social and cultural aspects, as inhabitants from different cultural backgrounds can 
experience a certain space in different ways (Ramadier and Moser 1998), including new middle and 
upper-class residents participating in favelas’ cultural events and venues. Therefore, during processes 
of transformation (both morphological and symbolic) in favelas, the urban environment of those spaces 
becomes part of the cognitive lexicon of wealthier classes; that is, they become more readable (and 
consequently less intimidating) and more appealing to outsiders for different investments and social 
practices. 
Many of the securitization tactics and legibility interventions experienced in Brazilian favelas 
emerged from the economic restructuring of cities and the growing influence of globalized economic 
flows and the need to secure or optimize them. In Southern cities, the growing influence of globalized 
trade and investment promoted private capital as the primary driving force behind recent municipal 
politics, planning action, and spatial development (Harvey 1989; Lefebvre 1991; Fainstein 2010). Yet 
in many cases, the shift from manufacturing to a service sector, technology, finance, and real-estate 
investment driven economy created powerful urban regimes and special interest groups that prevented 
municipal governments from effectively accounting for collective interests and benefits (Pierre 1999; 
Kearns and Paddison 2000; Sassen 2011; Atkinson and Bridge 2004). Such processes often took place 
in the context of a transition to democracy, or a shift from “local government” to “local governance,” 
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and entailed more democratic power, accountability, and transparency (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). 
However, in some cases, they also coexisted with populist politics couched in subtler neoliberal policies 
(Weyland 1999; Nuijten, Koster and de Vries 2012). As a result, cities in the global South became 
hamstrung by capacity and governance deficits symptomatic of the post-colonial condition (Roy 2011a; 
Watson 2009; Robinson 2011). They also saw the consolidation of decision-making powers amongst 
elite groups (Swyngedouw 2005) and the reinforcement of rent capture practices (Smith 2002). 
 
Discourses and practices of neighborhood regeneration arose from this backdrop of structural 
biases towards decentralized network governance approaches, a persistent unraveling of public sector 
planning and decision-making authorities, and concentrated power amongst urban elites. In the early 
2000s, urban geography and development scholars took interest in urban regeneration and started to 
examine concurrent socio-spatial changes within self-built settlements and other low-income 
neighborhoods together with nascent gentrification trends. In their views, gentrification is basically a 
strategy of the global international elite in its search for capital accumulation (Smith 2002; Atkinson 
and Bridge 2004) that required “elastic yet targeted” definitions (Clark 2005). Yet today, the extension 
of the term to the global South is facing a backlash for its overstretching (Maloutas 2012) and for 
extending Western-derived urban theory onto the rest of the world through path dependency processes 
(Ghertner 2015). Despite this debate, urban scholars continue to refer to gentrification to examine urban 
restructuring and socio-spatial change in cities of the global South (Ley and Teo 2014; Lees et al. 2015; 
Lopez-Morales 2015; Lees et al. 2016). In this paper, we consider gentrification in the global South – 
through our research in Rio – to be an adaptable process and concept with certain assumptions that need 
to be carefully scrutinized and empirically tested, something which has been increasingly adopted 
beyond academic circles. In that sense, we assume that gentrification can experience transformation 
through time and space. 
Gentrification in Rio does not necessarily involve what Lees describes as “intensive and uneven 
processes of capital-led restructuring with significant influxes of upper- and middle-income people and 
large doses of class-led displacement from deprived urban areas” as uneven and combined development 
takes place (Lees et al. 2015, p. 441; Slater 2009). When studying gentrification in the global South, 
one must consider that cities such as Rio encompass diverse types of land tenure, informal economies, 
and alliances between elites and marginalized groups, which forces us to move beyond the concepts of 
rent gap and rent-seeking, commodification of housing, private property rights and profit accumulation, 
or working-class neighborhoods (Ghertner 2015; Bernt, 2016; Anguelovski et al. In Production). Others 
claim the need to even alter gentrification theory to account for new dynamics of exclusion and new 
examples of how they take place (e.g. Waley 2016; Lees et al. 2016). Furthermore, studying 
gentrification in the South requires moving beyond victimization and caricaturization of the urban poor 
7 
 
as subjects deprived of resources or agency (Roy, 2011b) and adopting postcolonial and subaltern 
urbanism approaches (Lees et al. 2015; Roy 2011b). 
In the case of slums and informal settlements, their historical illegal status and unique morphology 
made them especially illegible to market forces and the state, which then prompted new urban codes 
and legislation to describe favelas as “subnormal settlements” framed as “Zones of Special Urbanistic 
Interest.”iii Instead of adapting the urban lexicon to favelas, Brazilian legislation has made them “zones 
of exception” (Roy 2011b) that need to be rendered legible. Yet, once formerly residual urban spaces 
in trendy zonesiv (i.e., spaces of exception) start to receive investments and economic and symbolic 
value, the state will then attempt to make such spaces more legible to its interests and those of private 
investors (Handzic 2010). Locally, we observed that this process ultimately affects the ways in which 
residents experience their neighborhood spaces, including public spaces. 
In our study, we hypothesize that gentrification is taking place in Rio’s favelas in a unique way. 
We treated gentrification as an assumption – or like the “urban society” of Henri Lefebvre, a virtual 
object (Lefebvre 2003 [1970], p.3) – which manifests solid signs and could generate epistemology 
through a transduction methodology. We do not have conclusive proof that, overtime, an entire class 
(and racial group) would be replaced by another. It is definitely an ongoing process, affected by some 
specific conditions, but one whose signs are being strongly felt and voiced by long-term residents. To 
inductively illustrate these signs, we examine how sources of state/market sponsored upgrading 
promulgate particular forms of legibility. In our case, formal state-led urbanization, land tenure 
provision, investments in tourism, enclosure, and policing in favelas increase legibility, which then lead 
to displacement and the slow erasure of local residents through the imposition of new disciplines. From 
this, we note how the agents of socio-spatial change in neoliberal cities can select from a myriad of 
disciplinary pathways (e.g. through policing/securitization, environmental upgrading, and 
neighborhood investments) to further particular and pre-defined forms of urban legibility. 
 
Methodology 
This paper uses an emblematic and critical case study approach of slum upgrading through public 
space enhancement and increased pacification in the connected favelas of Babilônia and Chapeu 
Mangueira in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. These two communities are situated in the district of Leme, one of 
the wealthiest districts of the South Zone of Rio. Since both favelas are located on the same hill – also 
called Babilônia – we only refer to “Babilônia” in our analysis. Babilônia and Chapeu Mangueira were 
selected because they are smaller and less dense compared to other favelas in Rio (and even the South 
Zone). Both also have attractive ocean views and a high concentration of green space, which makes 
them more livable while also more vulnerable to gentrification pressures. We considered that favelas in 
Rio are not only some of the most emblematic slums in the world, but they also illustrate current 
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examples of state-led regeneration and upgrading in the context of external investments and mega-
events. 
Our fieldwork included three different stages: first in March 2015 (immediately after the World 
Cup and before the Olympic Games), second in July 2016 (during the Olympic Games), and finally in 
February-March 2018 (after the mega-events and the financial crisis). We consider this a critical period 
for favela communities in Rio, not only because real estate fluctuated intensely but also because it shows 
that the structure of the Pacification Police (UPP) was fragile and became destabilized soon after the 
Olympic Games. As of early 2018, Rio is also experiencing one of the city’s worst security crisis in 
history, which has again boosted prejudice against favelas and heightened security, control, and 
discipline. 
In the first phase of our research, we used a snowball sampling approach to conduct semi- 
structured interviews with key informants. This included developing interview instruments for long- 
established residents – including the president and members of the neighborhood association – new 
residents, planners/architects, and officers from the Rio Pacification Police (UPP). We combined these 
interviews with numerous field observations in new public spaces and other upgraded areas of 
Babilônia. Later, in July 2016, we followed these communities during the preparation for the Olympic 
Games. Our goal was to understand social changes and the evolution of local rules and norms from the 
beginning of the upgrading process until the completion of two mega-events that profoundly 
transformed Rio’s urban space and redevelopment. 
During the interviews, we asked respondents about their personal experience of public spaces, the 
diversity of activities practiced in those spaces, important changes inside the community and 
interactions between residents from different backgrounds, and about the evolving role of government 
agents and planning professionals. We also asked about the interactions between tourists and locals and 
about their perceptions of changes within the community after real estate prices started to increase. In 
particular, we asked about residents’ perceptions of public and private investment in environmental 
improvements, their changing use of upgraded public (and green) spaces, and their experiences with 
police patrol, profiling practices, and community resistance strategies in the favelas. Architects and 
planners were also consulted about their criteria and priorities for each upgrading project, challenges 
that appeared along the way, interactions between them, the residents, and the government, and their 
perception of the impact of gentrification in these favelas. Finally, questions to the UPP focused on the 
role of the police inside the community, the process of regulating public spaces, and possible community 
conflicts. Here it is important to mention that in 2016, Babilônia elected a new neighborhood association 
president, which led to a different discourse towards changes inside the community. Finally, in February 
and March 2018, we re-interviewed some key neighborhood actors to update some of our earlier data 
with more community experiences since the mega events. It is also important to mention that, in contrast 
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to our field research in 2015 and 2016, during our last visits in the community in 2018, UPP officers 
did not want to respond to any interviews and neighborhood association members advised us not to visit 
the favela unaccompanied.  
 
Marginality and Urban Upgrading in South Zone Favelas 
Within Rio de Janeiro, ‘hill’ (morro in Portuguese) and ‘asphalt’ (asfalto in Portuguese) have long 
been symbols of two different societies (Gonçalves 2013). Due to Rio’s unique topography, residual 
areas in the city were located throughout the hills, where many favelas were built. Over the years, a 
mixture of financial constraints, lack of land tenure, and the constant threat of removals led favela 
dwellers to refrain from investing in their own housing. During much of the twentieth century, 
consecutive municipal administrations ignored or tried to eradicate land occupation on the hills (Conde 
and Magalhães 2004). For most of this period, the urban middle class was reluctant to expand upwards 
into the favelas due to violence and the “myths of marginality” (Pearlman 1977), which referred to 
negative stereotypes and preconceptions about favelas and their residents. For favela residents, 
however, the lack of investment interest shielded them from the most intense real estate pressures facing 
the city. 
Beginning in the 1990s, as part of democratization and the introduction of new governance 
processes, the government began to openly express the intention to integrate the favelas into the 
“formal” city. Early experiences of favela upgrading culminated in the most well-known program, the 
Favela Bairro (1994), which facilitated massive investments into regenerating medium-sized favelas 
(between 500 and 2500 households) by utilizing financial support from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Pearlman 2010). Considered an international success, Favela Bairro represents 
one of the largest upgrading programs of its kind in Brazil and has since served as an exemplar for 
similar programs across Latin America. 
For Rio, the legacy of Favela Bairro meant that removal policies have been less commonly 
adopted and deployed. Current policy paradigms focus on improving favelas’ environment instead of 
promoting its cleansing. For favelas in Rio’s South Zone in particular, which have some of the best 
views over the ocean, areas that were once considered an urban problem are now seen as a valuable 
asset. In 2009, a unit of the Pacification Police (UPP) was installed in Babilônia after being deployed 
in other neighborhoods as soon as 2007 (See Table 1 below). Developed by the municipal Department 
of Security (Secretaria de Segurança), the UPP’s goal is to reinforce the presence of the state, 
permanently remove drug traffic from favela communities, and foster a closer relationship between 
citizens and the government. Although data show that UPP presence has contributed to lower violence 
rates in Rio in general (Cano, 2012), we note that strategic planning policies in the city have been 
accompanied by “states of exceptions” regimes (Vainer 2011) and by street normalization through 
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discipline, punishment, and state control (Rubino 2005). Thus, we argue that the municipality has 
pacified historically stigmatized favelas using discourses of the “city of fear” (phobolosis as defined by 
Lopes de Souza 2008). 
 
Table 1. Summary of recent key events for favela’s transformation in Rio 
 
Year Key Events Related Developments and Implications 
2007 The Government of Rio launches the 
UPPs, pacification police stations aimed 
at bringing an arm of the state into the 
favelas. 
UPPs brought a general sense of safety to Rio’s 
residents and tourists, boosting tourism and 
commercial initiatives focused on outsiders.  
2007-2009 Brazil is selected to host the 2014 World 
Cup and Rio de Janeiro is selected to 
host the 2016 Olympic Games. 
 
Private value capture combined with growing 
investments led to skyrocketing real estate speculation 
in subsequent years. The South Zone was one of the 
most affected areas. 







Favelas participating in Morar Carioca received 
investments in infrastructure, housing and public 
spaces, making them more appealing. Frequent media 
coverage related to such improvements highlighted the 
peaceful status of some favela communities. Tourism 
and real estate prices continued to rise, bringing new 
symbolic values to favelas.  
2016 New political scandals began to emerge 
during one of the largest economic 
recessions in Brazilian history. 
 
In October, right after the Olympic 
Games, Rio’s Security Secretary, José 
Mariano Beltrame, resigns. Beltrame was 
in office for 10 years during which he 
introduced UPP units across the city. 
 
The governor of Rio de Janeiro announced an 
austerity package to balance public accounts and 
mitigate public deficit. This led to late payments to 
state employees, including the military police. 
 
Many security specialists affirm that UPPs are failing 
(including Beltrame) and must be rethought. Real 
estate prices plummeted due to the recession. 
 
2017 Wars between rival drug gangs intensify 




Conditions of violence again emerge from within 
favelas across Rio. Commercial activities in touristic 
favelas suffer from a slight loss of customers. 
 
2018 The Brazilian Senate approves federal 
intervention to improve Rio’s security, 
leading to the presence of army forces 
inside the city and favela communities. 
 
The city is again considered to be in a state of war. 
Gentrification in touristic favelas of the South Zone 




In 2010, the municipality launched a new program, Morar Carioca, to completely and permanently 
integrate favelas into Rio’s urban fabric by 2020 as a part of the legacy of the 2016 Olympic Games.v In 
this process, Babilônia and Chapeu Mangueira were selected as pilot sites. At the time, Morar Carioca 
was designed to be the most comprehensive program of favela rehabilitation in Rio’s history, with a budget 
of R$8 billion (approximately US$4.5 billion at the time) (Leitão and Delecave 2013). In contrast to Favela 
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Bairro, Morar Carioca focused on favela de-densification and the enforcement of stricter rules for new 
building constructions in a more coercive model of growth control (Magalhães 2013). Not only focusing 
on infrastructure and housingvi, Morar Carioca promised new public spaces and sustainable public 
facilities along with participatory planning processes. 
This combined process of favela consolidation, upgrading, and pacification has opened up opportunities 
for both local entrepreneurs and outside investors to channel money into previously inaccessible parts of 
the city and transforming the neighborhoods’ built environment (Gonçalves 2005; Cavalcanti 2009). 
Concurrently, since the early 2000s, real estate pressures have increased dramatically in Rio de Janeiro 
(see Figure 1). Thus, favelas in the South Zone – such as Vidigal, Rocinha, and Babilônia – are particularly 













Figure 2. Three emblematic Favelas of Rio (Rocinha, Vidigal, and Babilônia) amidst prime locations – 




Figure 3. Aerial view of Rio de Janeiro. We highlight the South Zone and favelas with privileged views to 




Before the World Cup and Olympic Games, some critics considered that investments in favela 
upgrades, coupled with states of exception and the creation of new growth and investment coalitions, were 
jeopardizing social inclusion, urban rights, and democratic gains attributed to the different urban reform 
agendas (Gaffney 2010; Hérnandez-Medina 2010, Rolnik 2011). Like Vidigal and Rocinha, Babilônia is 
similarly vulnerable to gentrification pressures. The favela is inhabited by around 4,000 residents 
benefiting from a large amount of preserved vegetation and an ecological trail, which is unusual for favelas 
in Rio, where massive densification generally erases any environmental amenities. Babilônia is therefore 
highly attractive to outsiders. Furthermore, Morar Carioca projects brought new eco-friendly 
constructions, the revitalization of major pathways, and the urbanization of access and leisure areas (see 
Figure 4). New plazas and viewpoints – wooden decks attached to the main pathways – sprung up across 
the neighborhood. Such amenities are easily accessible by revitalized staircases and benefit from new 
paved slopes (see Figure 5). This increasingly peaceful and green environment, privileged location, recent 
upgrading, and attractive views have boosted tourism and the arrival of new middle or upper-class residents 
and visitors. Many local bars with English menus have been opened, and some of them offer two-course 
lunch menus for US$30, far beyond the reach of local residents. A new upscale art gallery with a view of 
the ocean has also recently opened. Besides that, in 2016, there were 18 hostels in Babilônia, but only eight 
of them were managed by locals (Fagerlande 2018). 
 
 




Figure 5. New “plazas”: wooden decks attached to the hills to create additional space (Photo: Thaisa Comelli, 
2015) 
 
Increasing local real estate prices are reflected in local studies. A 2012 report by the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation (FGV) showed that after the arrival of the UPPs in Babilônia, the rent of two- bedroom 
apartments in Leme increased by 80% and their sale price by 138% (FGV, 2012). During our 2016 
fieldwork, we identified one-bedroom apartments in Babilônia renting for more than US$400 a month, in 
a context where local residents’ average wage is US$460 a month. Still, in 2018, almost two years after 
the Olympic Games, apartments in Babilônia show a sale price of R$700,000 or R$7,950 per square meter 
(approximately US$190,000 or US$2,160 per square meter)vii. However, it is challenging to evaluate 
gentrification through property or rental prices within favelas in Rio due to the widespread reported 
presence of informal transactions taking place in the selling and renting of properties (Pearlman 2016). 
Even in Rio’s more formal neighborhoods, the local government does not provide systematic real estate 
data and most information is held by several private agencies or associations. We also observed that, during 
the past years, real estate prices swelled throughout the city in general,viii encompassing almost all 
neighborhoods and making it harder to evaluate the degree to which the UPPs, upgrading projects, or 
mega-events played a role in particular favela communities. However, since the Olympic Games in 2016, 
the combination of political scandals, economic recessions, and security crisis have contributed to lower 
pricesix and slowed down tourism. In Babilônia, our fieldwork reveals that from the eighteen hostels that 
existed in 2010, only eight remain. In this changing context of public-private securitization, investment, 
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and tourism development, the next section examines how concurrent processes of favela securitization and 
public space upgrading and greening have facilitated new forms of control and discipline in Babilônia, as 
well as how residents have been confronting them. 
 
Paradoxical Experiences of Favela Pacification and Upgrading 
This section shows that the attempt to achieve socio-spatial legibility in Babilônia’s spaces – i.e. more 
recognizable and symbolically accessible environments – is leading to different forms of physical, 
symbolic, and economic discipline that catalyze gentrification and produce contradictory experiences for 
favela residents. Here, capital-oriented urban planning strategies renew the role of the state inside slums 
to create new market visibility for outside visitors and investors and eventually produce social 
invisibilization and displacement. Figure 6 below shows the main roles of the actors involved in the 
upgrading programs and pacification policies, along with the results of such policies for long-time 























The State + Local 
Government: increasing 
presence inside favelas 
(rule of law) through 
policing and pacification 
programs. 
 
State + Local 
Government + Global 
Institutions (IADB, 






Outside Market + 
Local entrepreneurs: 
investments in tourism / 
commercial activities, 
land speculation, 




Residents paradoxical experiences from 
new socio-spatial dynamics 
 
Physical Discipline 
Positive experiences: safer environment, 
decrease of drug trafficking.  
Negative experiences: intimidation, racial 
profiling, coercion, body violence.  
 
Economic Discipline 
Positive experiences: new job opportunities, 
increase in income through local 
entrepreneurship. 
Negative experiences: unaffordability of 
goods and activities, profit ventures and 
initiatives which exclude local, “classic” 
gentrification (“white expulsion”) and 
environmental gentrification (removals/re-
locations from green privileged areas). 
 
Symbolic Discipline 
Positive experiences: enhanced social 
connections between locals and outsiders, 
breaking of stigmas, exchange of cultural 
practices.  
Negative experiences: inhibition/erasure of 







The relationship between the residents of Babilônia and UPP agents has been uneasy since their 
initial arrival, which has strongly affected the local public environment and residents’ use of public 
spaces. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine security policies in greater depth, our 
field observations and interviews reveal that the physical constraints imposed by the UPP in communal 
areas cannot be ignored. Even during the community’s most prosperous and peaceful times, many 
residents expressed a perception of being coerced and controlled in public spaces, noting how police 
presence is a way to make favelas more attractive for outsiders (interview 2015). 
Historically, pervasive crime, violence, and drug-trafficking in Rio’s informal settlements created 
long-lasting territorial stigma towards poor neighborhoods. Favela residents were traditionally 
imagined and portrayed by politicians and by the media as potential bandits and drug dealers. Although 
waves of crime come and go for decades, and disputes for territory in the city can be traced back to the 
first half of the twentieth century (mostly due to illegal gambling practices), it was in the 1980s that 
criminality became highly associated with drug trafficking and favelas (Misse 2007). During the 1990s, 
for instance, Rio was described as a city at war, which contributed to boost many major investments in 
favelas (Leite 2000). 
Amidst that context, the promise of a permanent presence of the state inside favelas generated 
optimism within many stigmatized residents. Therefore, during our first research phase in Babilônia in 
2015, when asked about the recent opening of the community to the outside and their more recent appeal 
to outsiders, residents were mostly unanimous in reporting this as a positive trend. They highlighted 
how the presence of outsiders reflected and further helped to break down former patterns of socio-
spatial stigmatization and negative preconceived views about residents and favelas more generally. One 
long-time resident also stressed how media and arts have helped to re-legitimate and re-value favelas 
during this process: 
“When did a long-established resident ever imagine that a movie or a soap opera would 
be recorded here? When I was younger and a TV reporter came to a Favela community, 
it was only to announce a gunfire shooting.” Young female resident, born and raised in 
Babilônia (2015) 
As a consequence of the neighborhood opening up, residents and outsiders have had greater 
contacts and social interactions with each other. When outsiders come to visit or live in the favela, they 
are able to move beyond preconceived views and appreciate their experience of the place. As a member 
of the Neighborhood Association highlighted: 
“I like it because our community learns to cohabit with them [outsiders] and they learn 
to cohabit with us. And for them, they imagine that they will find a dirty place, houses 
falling apart. But then they arrive here and see a different thing. And that's why they fall 
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in love. They don't want to leave here. They come and want to stay.” Neighborhood 
Association worker, born and raised in Babilônia (2015) 
Here, visitors break down negative stereotypes through social and physical contacts within the 
neighborhood.  
However, this opening has come with a price. Favelas have been secured through the Pacification 
Police (UPPs), which are permanently stationed up and downhill from Babilônia and are controlled by the 
military police. As typical across favelas in Rio, UPP officers holding semi-automatic rifles and machine 
guns guard the entrance of the neighborhood. UPP officers are also regularly circulating inside community 
streets and squares. Officially, the role of the UPP is to maintain a safer environment inside the favelas, 
avoid the further spread of the drug traffic, and protect residents from violence. According to UPP officers, 
their intervention ensures greater peace in the community and helps keep drug trafficking at controlled and 
unorganized levels (interview 2015). They also argue that, at least in Babilônia, most of the time drugs are 
sold within the community in private spaces and drug consumption is internal. 
Resident perceptions and experiences seem more mixed. Even though many of them recognize the 
fact that heavy drug-trafficking has decreased since the arrival of the UPP, others complain that their 
community was always peaceful and that the UPP was not necessary, at least compared to other favelas in 
Rio (interview 2015). Besides, community leaders argue that the UPP by itself does not address the need 
for structural social changes in Rio and in favelas more specifically; instead, what is needed is the 
elimination of racial segregation and stigma (interview 2016). Some interviewees further argued that the 
UPP program is a state-orchestrated strategy to control residents’ behavior, and not only those involved in 
drug trafficking: 
“Nothing changed for black people in Brazil. Before, senzalasx; today, favela. One of the 
biggest lies about the UPP project is that it deters the sale of narcotics and the presence 
of drug dealers. Here, there are no traffickers. Traffickers are the ones who sell drugs on 
a large scale, and there are no traffickers here… We experience a police state, in which 
the only branch of the state that acts here inside is the institution of the Military Police.” 
Neighborhood Leader (2016) 
Police militarization target not only drug dealers but also racially-profiled residents with no connection to 
local organized crime. In fact, many residents perceive the UPP presence as discriminatory and racist way 
to control specific subgroups within the community, namely Afro-Brazilians. Community leaders point to 
officers’ behavior as “aggressive” and “disrespectful” and accuse them of treating residents as “dogs,” 
forcing people to remain quiet in fear of arrests (interview 2016). 
By our final fieldwork phase in the community in early 2018, the situation had significantly 
worsened. As mentioned earlier, the renewed and widespread drug war between dealing factions has 
dramatically affected penitentiaries and favelas throughout the country. In February 2018, army forces 
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entered Rio allegedly to reinforce security until the municipality recovers enough financial and 
logistical capacity to address the crisis. Even though Babilônia has always been one of the calmest 
favelas in Rio, such incidents severely affected local tourism and livelihoods (Fagerlande 2018). One 
resident noted this towards outsiders and researchers: 
“Don’t come up here. The climate is not very good these days. Wait a few weeks... If 
you find a resident who takes responsibility for you, you can come, but it is at your own 
risk.” Neighborhood Association worker (March 2018) 
In sum, the unsafe environment favelas have experienced most recently again has affected the lives of 
Babilônia residents and has been used by the government to build upon previous efforts and justify 
more explicit and renewed physical discipline -- what Willis calls the Right to Kill (2015) inside the 
community. Normalized profiling and violence further legitimizes arrests and killings.  
 
Symbolic Discipline 
In addition to explicit forms of physical discipline, a militarized presence of the state in Babilônia 
is used to achieve neighborhood legibility through regulating and disciplining consumption and cultural 
practices – a form of more symbolic control of residents. 
As the UPP is responsible for approving activities and events organized in public areas, especially 
those in the newly upgraded wooden decks constructed through Morar Carioca investments, police 
officers are also helping to reshape Babilônia to fit the consumption tastes of white Brazilian middle 
class and foreigners. Before the arrival of the UPP in 2009, local authorities had little control over the 
social practices and traditions of favela residents. During interviews, residents claimed to have routinely 
organized outdoor barbecues and celebrations in different public spaces across the communities, 
negotiating the terms and rules of such events among themselves (interview 2015). In contrast, the 
police now act as a regulator of events in public spaces, prompting some residents to argue that officers 
are abusing their power and depriving residents of their socio-cultural rights (interview 2015). Also, 
long-time residents (and even some foreign private investors) argue that the UPP tend to favor events 
promoted by gentrifiers and newcomers in the newly built plazas, with authorized events focused on 
attracting tourists. One of the strongest sources of conflict is the deck of a touristic bar called Estrelas 
da Babilônia (Babilônia Stars). Residents claim that the bar owner has appropriated this public space 
for commercial use, preventing locals from carrying out their own recreational activities: 
“Before […] a resident could party in the streets, everyone gathered together. Nowadays 
all of this is forbidden. To be able to organize an event there, I had to ask the UPPs, but 
they vetoed the event. […] So, we don't have public spaces in the community anymore. 
I don't know what happens, because [the bar owner] just arrived. Every weekend there 
is Latino Music there. The UPP allows it every weekend. [….] The truth is that his bar 
is for tourists. […] I think that the officers want us – little by little – to leave the 
20 
 
community and have fun in other places, so this place can turn into a tourism venue.” 
Local bar owner (2015) 
In sum, the local police is protecting, legitimizing, and even (in)directly promoting the economic 
activities of newcomers.  
In response to community complaints, the UPP notes that officers do not discriminate when 
they regulate events or individuals in the community (interview 2015). What they call “peaceful” 
events are not prohibited. However, officers argue that events such as Baile Funk (traditional Afro-
Brazilian music) have long been associated with drug trafficking and orgies, and that they are 
more dangerous social events that need to be regulated or prohibited (interview 2015). Despite 
claims about non-discrimination, the UPP’s descriptions of the process for authorizing local 
events show an inclination towards gentrifiers: 
“We have an art gallery here. If you are organizing a vernissage there, there’s no way that we will deny 
it. But not if in the same gallery you are organizing a Baile Funk. Baile Funk does not only require our 
authorization, it requires the authorization of the Department of Security and the Fire Station. Before the 
UPP, Baile Funk parties were a huge ‘market of drugs’. Everyone knows that – drugs, orgy, everything 
[…] But there’s no discrimination for any kind of event.” UPP Officer (2015) 
Foreigners who have invested in Babilônia confirm UPP discriminatory practices, though some of them 
attempt to organize Afro-Brazilian events (which the UPP often authorizes) as a way to revisibilize 
local cultural practices, encourage residents to mobilize and reoccupy public spaces (interview 2016), 
and build counter-narratives about Afro-Brazilian celebrations as vibrant, locally-embedded, and 
inclusive socio-cultural practices.  
The restrictions towards Baile Funk celebrations are raising community concerns over racial 
stigmas and profiling against the cultural traits of some favela residents – Afro-Brazilians in particular 
– thus contributing to the elimination of such practices from the community’s daily life. Such 
transformations are illustrative of symbolic forms of invisibilization, gentrification, and concurrent 
processes of both racial dispossession (of Afro-Brazilians) and racial privilege (of white middle-class 
gentrifiers and visitors) produced by contemporary capitalism and transnational investment in Latin 
American cities. As Janoschka et al. (2014) argue, the implementation of neoliberal policies tends to 
restrict possibilities for poor and excluded populations to appropriate space for their social and 
economic reproduction, and it privileges the consumption taste and behavior of newcomers. Even 
though Baile Funk was culturally produced mostly in the favelas, this celebration has spread to private 
enclosed middle- and high-class clubs visited mostly by white Brazilians.xi Therefore, community 
leaders and local nonprofits regret the criminalization of Afro-Brazilian cultural practices, their 
elimination from public spaces, and their displacement, appropriation, and commodification in 
exclusive social clubs for the pleasure of tourists and upper classes (interview 2016). As Harvey (2004) 
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notes, this represents a form of black cultural dispossession by white appropriation and exploitation. 
From the residents’ point of view, the criminalization and prohibition of Baile Funk parties in 
Babilônia is an emblematic example of how the local government invibilizes favela culture and controls 
residents’ socio-spatial right to public space and local traditions. Even though public and green spaces 
have become more abundant, beautified, and formalized, residents feel removed from their 
neighborhoods and compelled to leave the neighborhood to carry out activities that have always been 
common inside the community, which might prove to be unsafe in other favelas: 
“If I want to go to a Baile Funk party, I have to go to other communities and put myself 
at risk. Because when you go to a Baile Funk party you don't come back early, so it is 
dangerous. I don't go anymore. I prefer to stay at home.” Chapeu Mangueira resident  
(2015) 
In doing so, residents therefore face a double risk – the one of losing their culture and the one of losing 
their lives as they enter other (and maybe rival) favelas to access traditional cultural identity and 
practices. 
Besides conflicts due to cultural events and celebrations, our study also shows that symbolic 
discipline can be seen through the practices of tourists who visit the community via organized tours. 
Although residents mostly note that the presence of tourists can break stigmas and provide fruitful 
exchanges between people from different cultural backgrounds (interview 2015), many residents 
critique the way in which community tours are being handled and codified by the government and 
private initiatives as a form of slum tourismxii (see Frenzel and Koens 2012). When criticizing tourism 
carried by outside companies, residents argue that the contact between tourists and long-time residents 
may be superficial and actually prevent the meaningful exchange of knowledge on the community’s 
past and current struggles (interview 2015). Interviewees further complain that tourists sometimes only 
visit beautified and upgraded areas that create a manicured image of favelas: 
“The municipality only puts make-up in some places, especially where the tourists go. I 
do not have anything against the tourists, everyone is a human being, but they do not say 
hello. They pass by you and they want to see the landscape. They do not want to know 
about the origins of those living here. They use the same places that we do. The 
difference is that they only go to the places where there was any kind of intervention.” 
Babilônia Resident who participated in public space revitalization projects (2015) 
Even though brief visits to Babilônia might make outsiders more sympathetic towards residents, they 
do not provide enough impact or knowledge to further their understanding of local life experiences or 
to make visitors rethink issues of poverty and inequality (Jones and Sanyal 2015).  
 
In sum, even though the relations between the formal and informal city are now more intense and 
frequent in Rio, social exchanges in upgraded public spaces are still weak and superficial. Symbolic 
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discipline inside the community does not seem to compensate for the damage to a community’s loss of 
socio-cultural habits, traditions, and experienced racism. 
 
Economic Discipline 
So far, we considered physical and symbolic forms of discipline as attached to gentrification in South 
Zone favelas. However, the most classic forms of gentrification in Babilônia are taking place through 
economic means. State-led urban upgrading programs are reclaiming and rebranding the city for 
businesses, middle classes, and market forces more generally (Hackworth 2002; Smith 2002; Lees 2012; 
Davidson 2008; Rousseau 2009), while applying what Ghertner (2015) identifies as extra-economic 
force and state violence. 
During our first visit in Babilônia in 2015, hostels, bars, and art galleries had been sprouting up 
all over the community. Even though some residents did not know the formal concept of gentrification, 
all of them associate these new investments to externally driven rising real estate prices and land and 
property speculation. In response, according to the former President of the Neighborhood Association, 
some mobilization emerged early on against speculation and the risk of land formalization in the 
community. Residents feared that new real estate transactions benefited outsiders, either middle-class 
Rio residents who come to invest in the favelas or foreigners, resulting in possible coerced 
displacements: 
“The proposal was to initiate the process of regularizing land ownership [when Morar 
Carioca started]. But I alerted the residents of the danger of land ownership 
regularization after the UPP. If land ownership regularization had come before the UPP, 
I would look at it with other eyes, but coming after the UPP, it is very dangerous because 
you will increase and amplify the desire for speculation… [Regularization] is also 
included in this ‘package’ of removal.” Neighborhood Association President (2015) 
As these words illustrate, residents started to see land tenure regularization and/or land titling in Rio 
with an eye of concern and have subsequently moved away from demanding a formalization of their 
land occupation – a departure from what previous studies have considered as tools for securing 
sustainable livelihoods and erasing poverty (Minnery et al. 2013).   
However, in contrast to many gentrifying neighborhoods in the global North, Babilônia and 
Chapeu Mangueira residents are not yet collectively organizing or participating in formal resistance 
movements against gentrification. Within embryonic forms of economic gentrification, many residents 
see possible benefits, such as a chance to grow financially and achieve social mobility (interviews 
2015). Some interviewees revealed their enrollment in state-sponsored training programs and their 
interest in the new job opportunities and courses for tourism professionals that have accompanied the 
upgrades (interviews 2015). Small business owners interviewed also see such opportunities as a chance 
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to achieve greater decision-making power over their housing situation and to benefit from the economic 
development of their community, so that leaving or staying in the community can be a choice and not 
an issue of survival (interviews 2015). 
Some long-term residents are also becoming small entrepreneurs by renting parts of their 
property to visitors and becoming informal real estate professionals. Some new bars geared toward 
tourists are being established as residents, immediately after the arrival of the UPP, anticipated new 
capital inflows and investments to open new or rehabilitate former establishments (interviews 2015). In 
other cases, they participate in a reforestation cooperative and become tourist guides of the green reserve 
at the top of the Babilônia hill. In these specific cases, instead of being replaced by new middle-class 
residents, established inhabitants are empowering themselves to become the new local middle-class: 
“It's progress, but progress is complicated. People have to adapt to the new way and to 
interact with what the government is proposing for this place. We cannot stay like it was 
before. We cannot stay stopped in time, and you have to enjoy the opportunities to start 
something new… It is pulling everyone. I come with the bar, and then other person 
comes with another bar, and then other person comes with handicrafts, others with a nice 
project... So, it's a good thing”. Bar Owner (2015) 
In the views of these new business owners, being entrepreneurial and catering to visitors will give long 
term residents new opportunities to grow.  
Residents’ attempt to profit from the growing interest of outsiders and reinvent themselves instead 
of being slowly evicted might help to slow down class-based displacement inside the community. Still, 
those who are not property owners particularly suffer from higher rental prices. Even those who do own 
properties conclude that besides eating and sleeping, leisure or other activities are no longer affordable 
(interviews 2015). Moreover, even though the government has implemented social rental or discounts 
to gas and light bills to subsidize the poorest families and residents displaced by upgrading programs, 
these forms of assistance seem too basic to address the complex pressures and processes of 
gentrification and eviction. 
Finally, representatives of the local government (through Morar Carioca projects) along with 
private investors have played a role in the physical eviction of residents living in green areas in 
Babilônia through a new type of economic discipline. While long-term residents initiated green space 
protection in the uphill areas of the community in the 2000s, a commercial shopping center in the South 
Zone now helps to finance its protection, maintenance, and promotion (interview 2015). Furthermore, 
the creation of this green space also included the eviction and relocation of some of the oldest residents 
and their homes that were labeled as being located in “high risk” or “protected areas,” which 
coincidently were the areas with the most attractive views in the community. While some residents 
relocated without much resistance, others lament the small size of new apartments and their loss of 
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access to green space as they were moved downhill (interview 2016). This can be interpreted as 
environmental gentrification (Checker 2011; Anguelovski 2016) and “white cleaning,” and reveals the 
role of private capital in ensuring the legibility of public and open spaces in the favela and in becoming 
a primary driving force behind municipal planning. In other words, the physical removal of uphill 
residents has allowed the privatization and enclosure of the green space for the benefit of investors and 
outside visitors, while previous residents have born the environmental costs. Green and open spaces 
have thus become landscapes of pleasure and privilege (Anguelovski et al. In Production) for visitors 
and newcomers through processes of securitization, privatization, and eviction. 
Today, aside from the above mentioned assistance for evicted residents or discounts in utility, 
no specific action – or even discussion – has been taken to address gentrification in Babilônia. Architects 
and members of the Neighborhood Association regret the lack of municipal action about exclusion and 
displacement, yet they consider the changes brought on by gentrification as inevitable: 
“Our goal is to guarantee this favela has the right to turn the community into a 
neighborhood. Once we try to do it with more rationality, more quality, in the best way 
we can, it will attract others. We cannot do something with quality to be repulsive. It is 
not our job; it is contradictory. We want to improve the situation, and once we do it, 
gentrification happens. There must be government supervision in this process.” Architect 
working on upgrading projects in Babilônia and Chapeu Mangueira (2015) 
Urban redevelopment in Rio illustrates socio-spatial tensions present in many revitalized or revitalizing 
neighborhoods in the global North, wherein physical and environmental improvements can be captured 
by elites and reinforced by decisions made by urban designers and architects.  
In early 2018, despite increasing confrontations between dealers and police forces, economic 
gentrification pressures have dissipated though not fully disappeared. Residents highlight that this 
slowdown is only temporary until new developers return to the most appealing areas of Rio, which 
include favela communities in the hill of the South Zone. The current president of the neighborhood 
association highlights this readjustment in a longer process of neighborhood reevaluation and private 
value capture: 
“The recent confrontations [violent events between alleged drug dealers and the police 
in 2018] – it’s obvious, they interrupted the process of gentrification a bit… The UPP is 
now like a mirage [referring to the recent dismantling of the pacification project]. But of 
course, it’s not over yet. We know that all over Europe, people who live “on the hill” are 
rich. Even more in prime areas. Only in Brazil is this the opposite. It's important to 
highlight that." Neighborhood Association President (2018) 
Over the long term, pressures from external capital seem to be much stronger than the ability of residents 
to resist real estate speculation and price increases, even if some of them participate in the new economy 
as small entrepreneurs. Our analysis reveals that only external entrepreneurs and a few residents are 
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able to harness benefits from new economic opportunities. The current governance regime in Rio far 
from guarantees the implementation of a redistributive agenda, thus facilitating silent and more acute 
forms of spatial segregation and social exclusion. 
 
Discussion: Producing dispossession, invisibilization, and segregation through legibility 
Our study of public space upgrading in Babilônia contributes new insights into how capital-
oriented urban planning strategies in the global South renew the role of the state inside self-built 
settlements, create new market visibility, and eventually produce social and cultural invisibilization and 
displacement. Since the 1990s and into the recent World Cup (2014) and Olympic Games (2016), 
government agents in Rio preached progressive urban governance paradigms such as transparency, 
equality, inclusion, and participation. However, our research shows that through informal settlement 
upgrading projects and pacification policies, such new paradigms mask policies that ultimately make 
spaces more legible to economic and social actors outside of the favela. Socio-spatial legibility is thus 
creating a very peculiar process of gentrification: one based on intersecting forms of physical, symbolic, 
and economic discipline. 
In short, the concurrent processes of revitalization, enclosure, and policing of open spaces in 
favelas increase socio-spatial legibility, which then lead to displacement and erasure of local residents. 
The agents of legibility – which include the UPP (an organ of the state), outside investors, and tourists 
– can select from a myriad of disciplinary pathways to further particular and pre-defined forms of urban 
socio-spatiality and gentrification that residents, in turn, experience in ambiguous ways. State-led, top-
down urban upgrading in Rio’s favelas illustrates the key role played by state and private investors in 
boosting gentrification (Hackworth 2002; Smith 2002; Lees 2012; Davidson 2008; Rousseau 2009) and 
in molding and securing informal communities for the consumption behavior of outsiders. Such efforts 
are a means to reclaim and rebrand the city for businesses, middle classes, and market forces more 
generally, with important impacts on long-term residents, many of them Black residents. 
From a theoretical standpoint, contemporary approaches to favela public space upgrading entail 
a double process of co-creating securitization and segregation through environmental clean-up, upgrades 
and enclosure, and police violence in which the most socially and racially fragile residents are slowly 
being re-criminalized and dispossessed. First, upgrades in public spaces, along with a militarized 
permanent police presence in the community, have played a major role in coercing and oppressing 
residents to create a more legible community. Investments in environmental protection and the removal 
of residents from green spaces are accelerating this process. Although Babilônia is not traditionally 
marked by violent conflicts, recent events show that the environment inside Rio’s favelas is unstable 
and that physical tensions are increasingly acute. In October 2016, for instance, immediately after the 
Olympic Games, local newspapers announced that conflicts between the police and locals ended in two 
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deaths in Chapeu Mangueira. In 2017, many newspapers in the city alleged that rival criminal factions 
were already disputing the territory. In April 2018, confrontations between criminals led to a Special 
Operations Command action inside the hill of Babilônia. Even if many residents first experienced 
increased security in the favelas and outside acceptance due to the UPP pacification programs, they have 
also witnessed or lived through discriminatory practices and race- based persecution, which indicates a 
practice of state revanchism (see Smith 1996) towards Afro- Brazilian and low-income residents. The 
early presence of the UPP combined with upgrading interventions helped secure the path for 
gentrification and direct physical eviction from and militarized control of restored public and green 
spaces. 
Second, physical upgrades to public space through UPP actions and upgrading programs like 
Morar Carioca are reshaping community life in subtler ways, interfering with endogenous cultural and 
traditional manifestations – such as Baile Funk – through processes of securitization, control, and order. 
Our findings indicate that UPP officers tend to symbolically discipline residents and their practices by 
favoring events and parties organized by gentrifiers or for tourists, while more local events (far from 
the touristic path created by the upgrading programs) often do not receive approval. As a result, socio-
cultural practices of Afro-Brazilian residents, in particular, become invisibilized, erased, or 
dispossessed. Third, alliances between the state and the market have created new types of economic 
discipline, a more visible manifestation of gentrification that is rapidly increasing rent and real estate 
prices throughout the community. While several residents have become entrepreneurs, changes from 
within the community may be occurring faster than a majority of the residents can adapt to, and such 
changes have subsequently shifted community activism away from land tenure demands.  
Our analysis helps to theorize how capital-oriented slum upgrading and socio-spatial control in 
favelas can enable a revanchist city through a dialectic process of creation (of new public spaces and 
new legibility) and destruction (of practices, of symbols, and of local values). The apparent integration 
of the formal and informal city, of the rich and the poor, and of the “asphalt” and the “hill” is producing 
a new form of separation and fragmentation between them, either through public space use and police 
control in the short-term or through longer-term affordability threats. These experiences have brought 
on new socio-spatial and racial tensions that are in turn obliterating traditional socio-cultural 
manifestations in the favelas. New regulations – together with sanitized and green images of favelas – 
are slowly threatening residents’ right to their own neighborhoods by controlling residents’ daily 
behavior and movement through the space, undermining established social and cultural practices, and 
debilitating their ability to resist land speculation. 
From a policy standpoint, our study reveals that pacification, reinvestment, and gentrification 
can result in the bifurcation of space into the “marginal” and into the “gentrified”, where in fact the two 
can exist simultaneously and in the same militarized space. The various manifestations of gentrification 
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are reconfiguring the meanings, uses, and controls of public space while producing state/market 
legibility, environmental privilege, physical control, social cleansing, and economic restructuring. As 
the UPP secures gentrification and protects middle-class and/or white gentrifiers, they sanitize, repress, 
and exclude the most marginalized residents and then reshape a green, clean, and secure landscape for 
outsiders and their leisure practices. In other words, rendering the natural and social environment of the 
favela more legible to state and market control has transformed them into an object of discourse 
remaking, discipline, and control in which gentrification plays a central role. 
In that context, future research on gentrification in the global South must further unpack how a 
combination of improvements to the built and natural environment in self-built settlements come 
together to produce contested values upon which groups are competing in local spaces – within and 
across neighborhoods. It should explore how residents navigate, re-appropriate, or contest the 
converging public and private interests in redeveloping, formalizing, and (re)-racializing informal 
settlements. Last, new theoretical and empirical lenses are needed to understand how the re-
militarization of self-built settlements is transforming and shifting capital accumulation while avoiding 
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i In this article we use the generic terms “slums” and “informal settlements” because of their strong presence in 
the international popular and academic literature. However, we recognize the prejudice that may come attached 
to such words, and also to the fact that they encompass a variety of different urban settlements (with different 
degrees of informality, construction quality, or even economic status). We also used the word “favela” since it is 
the local term in Brazil, where the case study is located. 
 
ii Our understanding of public spaces for this study is broad, encompassing more traditional public spaces (which 
are less common in favelas) such as plazas, decks, streets, stairways, and even private spaces for public use. 
 
iii “Subnormal settlements” is the term officially used to describe favelas by the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics. “Zones of Special Urbanistic Interest” is a way to describe most favelas in order to adapt their urban 
projects to the Brazilian legal urbanization parameters. 
 
iv It is important to mention that most favelas, as is the case in Rio, are not located in coveted spots and 
neighborhoods. Therefore, their vulnerability to gentrification may not be significant. In this research, we address 
favelas that are already located in areas with high pressure from the real estate market and tourism. 
 
v See official government webpage dedicated to the legacy of the 2016 Olympic Games: 
http://www.brasil2016.gov.br/pt-br/legado/morar-carioca. Last accessed on 16 May 2018. 
 
vi Although Morar Carioca provided some new housing developments, it was not the focus of the program. To 
address housing deficit in Brazil, the federal government launched the program Minha Casa Minha Vida (My 
House My Life) in 2009, one year before Morar Carioca. 
 
vii Information sourced from local real estate websites (www.zapimoveis.com.br and www.nestoria.com.br). 
 




x During the period of slavery in Brazil, senzalas were the places where slaves were housed. 
 
xi Traditional funk parties such as Baile da Favorita used to take place in the favela of Rocinha, but now have 
special editions in private clubs in Monte Líbano, a wealthy recreation area in Leblon. 
 
xii During our first visit, tours were held by community-based associations and private companies. Recently, 
even community-based touristic activities have ceased. 
 
                                                     
